The dangerous practice of empathy. by Macnaughton, R.J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
12 July 2012
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Macnaughton, R.J. (2009) ’The dangerous practice of empathy.’, The Lancet., 373 (9679). pp. 1940-1941.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61055-2
Publisher’s copyright statement:
NOTICE: this is the authors version of a work that was accepted for publication in The Lancet. Changes resulting
from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control
mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted
for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in The Lancet, 373, 9679, 1940-1941, 2009,
10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61055-2
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
The art of medicine 
The dangerous practice of empathy  
An important role for the medical humanities is to stimulate imaginative insight into 
the lives and experience of others through literature and other art forms. The idea is 
that such exposure will develop “empathy” as an attribute useful in clinical practice. 
Those interested in medical humanities have promoted the importance of this 
concept, and the “practice of empathy” has become an icon of the growing medical 
humanities movement in the USA and the UK. US physicians have even gone so far 
as to adopt empathy as one of the accredited “skills” required by the American 
Council for Graduate Education. However, another crucial role of the medical 
humanities is to provide a critical watching brief on the way in which medicine can 
highjack complex ideas, confining and defining them in its own terms, and changing 
their meaning and impact. I would suggest that this has happened with the notion of 
empathy and that it is worthwhile examining the concept and discussing whether it 
makes sense to regard it as a clinical skill at all. I am not sure that empathy, in the 
sense of emotional identification, is possible. I also query the way that empathy has 
become an object of measurement among some physicians.  
Both of these concerns (about definition and measurement) derive from a 
fundamental problem with the philosophy of human nature espoused by traditional 
medical practice: that of regarding the patient as an object whose physical being, 
psychological responses, and emotional experiences can all be broken down, 
accessed, and recorded. Even David Hume, who thought that a “science of man” 
was possible, was cautious about how knowledge was to be obtained. As he says in 
his A Treatise of Human Nature: “We ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, 
but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.“ 
In clinical practice, the patient is the object of a physician’s scrutiny; the doctor 
maintains an objective distance. But empathy requires understanding of subjective 
experience: the patient feels something and the doctor should access comparable 
subjective feelings and “stand in the patient’s shoes”. This relationship, I would 
suggest, has to be one of subject and subject rather than object (patient) and subject 
(doctor). Some of the complexities become more apparent by considering empathy in 
psychotherapy. Carl Rogers advocated “person centred therapy”, an approach to 
psychotherapy which involves the therapist practising “congruence, empathy, and 
unconditional positive regard”. However, in developing his ideas, Rogers discussed 
the potential limitations of his view of empathy with the philosopher and theologian, 
Martin Buber. Buber’s view was that empathy was impossible in a therapeutic 
situation because of a mismatch of perspectives:  
“You [the therapist] have necessarily another attitude to the situation than he [the 
patient] does…You are not equals and cannot be. You have the great task, self-
imposed—a great self-imposed task to supplement this need of his and to do rather 
more than the normal situation.”  
Buber argues that the problem for the clinician or therapist is one of keeping the 
patient in objective relation to himself because of his “great task”. In his book I and 
Thou, Buber describes his view of human connectedness. He distinguishes between 
two modes of relationship, “I/Thou” and “I/It”. The former describes a relationship 
whereby two people encounter each other in an authentic way, without objectification 
of the other. “I/It” is his term for the kind of interaction that necessarily takes place in 
the clinic. One person meets the other not as a fellow being but as a 
conceptualisation or type of a person: as “doctor” or “patient”. A full experience of 
mutuality or understanding is not possible.  
As clinicians we may regard patients as biochemical machines that need fixing; as 
wayward children who need to be led to eat correctly/stop smoking/exercise; as 
boxes of molecules to which we can add other corrective molecules. Mary Midgley in 
Science and Poetry characterises this way of seeing as “atomisation”. Clinicians 
atomise their patients (psychologically and physically) but at the same time are 
expected to relate to them as complete entities, or essences. This can require many 
shifts in perspective during the course of a single consultation.  
If the kind of inter-relation that Buber describes is not appropriate for the clinical 
situation, does that mean empathy is not possible? Patients and doctors are physical 
beings who have some shared ideas of what it feels like to be in their bodies; to feel 
heat, cold, pain, or numbness. If I lay my cold hand upon a patient’s abdomen, I—as 
a person with skin sensitive to heat and cold—appreciate how my hand might feel 
and attempt to warm it or at least warn the patient that it might feel cold. However, as 
an emotional and cognitive being, what I am feeling and thinking is not apparent to 
the person who is with me. Their only access to my mind lies in what I say and how I 
look. As Edith Stein, a student of the Edmund Husserl, wrote in The Problem of 
Empathy:  
“What another person experiences at a certain moment is not directly given to me. 
But the presence of the other is directly given, and so is the awareness that the other 
is an experiencing self. This cannot be compared with other modes…of experience. 
The experience of another is unique. This means that other modes of experiencing 
only are of partial help in explaining how the subjective becomes intersubjective. It 
also means that there is no doubt about who is experiencing primarily, and who is 
sharing, or experiencing, the experience of the other.”  
It seems, then, that it is possible for us as clinicians to have some empathic 
understanding of what it might be like to be in someone’s shoes physically, but not 
psychologically. All that is possible psychologically is an awareness of the other as 
an experiencing being; and, if we are open enough and take time to ask, they can tell 
us what that experience is like.  
But are we in danger of missing a lot if we do not have some access to, or 
understanding of, a patient’s “real identity”. Returning to the claims of medical 
humanities, is it possible for clinicians to draw understanding of the experiencing 
other from their own encounters in Buber’s “normal” situation, where two people 
interact without any therapeutic relationship turning one of them into objects? 
Literary encounters would certainly not fulfil Buber’s requirement that intersubjectivity 
is the key to experiencing another person. The reader cannot experience 
intersubjectivity if she or he is not present in the world of the book. But although the 
reader is not physically present, an attentive reader can certainly be psychologically 
present. In her autobiographical novel, The Bell Jar, Sylvia Plath’s character, Esther, 
describes a severe depressive episode, unrelieved by sleep:  
“I saw the days of the year stretching ahead like a series of bright, white boxes, and 
separating one box from another was sleep, like a black shade. Only for me, the long 
perspective of shades that set off one box from the next had suddenly snapped up, 
and I could see day after day after day glaring ahead of me like a white, broad, 
infinitely desolate avenue.”  
This masterful metaphor of the blinds induces fear with a sense of monotony and 
pointlessness—what the character herself must be feeling, in fact. As readers we 
have direct access to what is in the fictional character’s mind: the writer is describing 
it for us. We have no such interpreter for the clinical situation. But it is important to 
exercise caution here. What readers experience in response to writing is not an 
authentic I/Thou experience. It is possible to shed tears in response to a particularly 
powerful passage, but then switch easily to the real world without the lingering 
distress that a real problem of this kind would cause.  
I suspect that this is also the case for doctors’ empathic responses to patients. I can 
be close to tears with a patient, but 10 minutes later engage in a light-hearted 
conversation with a colleague over coffee. The sadness, or fear, or whatever feeling I 
have experienced is not sustained, and is so different from what the patient is feeling 
that it seems disrespectful to suggest that I somehow participate in his or her 
experience.  
I have suggested that true empathy derives from an experience of intersubjectivity 
and this cannot be achieved in the doctor–patient relationship. But all is not lost. 
Doctors do not need to feel the distress of their patients themselves to do something 
about it. We may have a momentary mirroring of that patient’s feeling within us, but 
what we maintain is sympathy (feeling for not with the patient) and the need to 
respond. It is potentially dangerous and certainly unrealistic to suggest that we can 
really feel what someone else is feeling. It is dangerous because, outside the literary 
context, where we are allowed direct experience of what a fictional patient is feeling, 
we cannot gain direct access to what is going on in our patient’s head. As Stein says, 
only “their presence is directly given”—so our assumptions may be wrong and our 
response may be based on a false assumption. Any mirroring of feeling will always 
differ quantitatively and qualitatively from that patient’s experience. A doctor who 
responds to a patient’s distress with “I understand how you feel” is likely, therefore, to 
be both resented by the patient and self-deceiving.  
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